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CYBER WARFARE: APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION IN AN
INTERCONNECTED SPACE
Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann*
While the rules of the jus in bello are generally operative in cyberspace, it appears to be problematic to
apply the fundamental principle of distinction because of the systemic interconnection of military and civi-
lian infrastructure in the cyber realm. In this regard, the application of the accepted legal deﬁnition of mili-
tary objectives will make various components of the civilian cyber infrastructure a legitimate military
objective. In order to avoid serious repercussions for the civilian population that might follow from this
inherent interconnectedness, different concepts are analysed that could provide potential solutions for a
clearer separation of legitimate military targets and protected civilian installations and networks. The
approaches discussed range from the exemption of central cyber infrastructure components that serve
important civilian functions, to the creation of ‘digital safe havens’ and possible precautionary obligations
regarding the segregation of military and civilian networks. As a solution, the authors propose a dynamic
interpretation of the wording ‘damage to civilian objects’ within the principle of proportionality of Article
51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, an interpretation that would comprise the degradation of the functionality
of systems that serve important civilian functions.
Keywords: cyber warfare, principle of distinction, dual-use objects, precautionary obligations, principle of
proportionality.
1. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace is opening up a new war-ﬁghting domain: an artiﬁcial theatre of war, additional to
the natural theatres of land, air, sea and outer space.1 Today, cyberspace has become hugely
important for the military, and there is little doubt that it will only grow in importance in the
future. A recent report by the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission concludes
that ‘the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has long considered the ability to seize infor-
mation dominance as prerequisite for achieving victory in future high tech conﬂicts, but only
*University of Potsdam, robin.geiss@uni-potsdam.de.
The authors would like to thank Yaël Ronen and the anonymous reviewers for their critique and helpful comments.
1 ‘[C]yberspace is now as relevant a domain for DoD [Department of Defence] activities as the naturally occurring
domains of land, sea, air, and space. There is no exaggerating our dependence on DoD’s information networks for
command and control of our forces, the intelligence and logistics on which they depend, and the weapons tech-
nologies we develop in the ﬁeld’: United States Dept of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’ (February
2010, 37), http://www.defense.gov/qdr/.
As far as the Chinese position is concerned, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission has held
that ‘PLA [People’s Liberation Army] leaders have embraced the idea that successful war ﬁghting is predicated on
the ability to exert control over an adversary’s information and information systems, often pre-emptively. This goal
has effectively created a new strategic and tactical high ground, occupying which has become just as important for
controlling the battle space as its geographic equivalent in the physical domain’: US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, ‘Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabilities for Computer Network
Operations and Cyber Espionage’ (7 March 2012, 9), http://www.uscc.gov/RFP/2012/USCC%20Report_Chinese_
CapabilitiesforComputer_NetworkOperationsandCyberEspionage.pdf.
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recently has it begun to develop the capability to convert this strategic requirement into an oper-
ational possibility’.2
Against this background, today, there seems to be widespread consensus that ‘there is no legal
vacuum in cyberspace’.3 Certainly, as far as the jus in bello is concerned, this statement ﬁnds
support in the Martens Clause, Article 36 of Additional Protocol I4 and the Advisory Opinion
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons.5 Against this back-
ground, thus far, legal discussions have focused primarily on the question of when the laws of
war are applicable in relation to military cyber operations.6 First and foremost, this has been a
line-drawing exercise – that is, a threshold debate concerning the question of when military
cyber operations rise to the level of an armed conﬂict or, once there is an armed conﬂict, whether
they qualify as an ‘attack’ under the laws of war. These are fundamental questions given that only
an armed conﬂict renders applicable the laws of war and given that – at least according to the
majority opinion – only an ‘attack’ in the legal sense of Article 49 of Additional Protocol I is
constrained by the principles of distinction and proportionality.7
Much less attention, however, has been devoted to the question of how these fundamental
humanitarian law principles will work out in cyberspace. A recent report of the United
Nations Secretary General speaks about ‘new and unique challenges’ in this regard.8 The speciﬁc
technological characteristics and the sheer ‘otherness’ of cyberspace, compared to the natural
theatres of warfare, raise the question whether the application of the established humanitarian
legal principles also adequately meets the speciﬁc humanitarian concerns of the cyber domain
where military and civilian installations appear to be inherently interconnected. In particular,
this technological set-up of cyberspace poses a challenge to the application of the principle of
distinction.9 This is the focus of the present contribution.
Whereas it is technically possible to distinguish virtual targets in cyberspace – meaning that a
hyper-distinctive attack against a military network is certainly realistic – the application of the
2 Report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, ibid 15.
3 Cordula Dröge, ‘No Legal Vacuum in Cyberspace’ (online interview, 16 August 2011), http://www.icrc.org/eng/
resources/documents/interview/2011/cyber-warfare-interview-2011-08-16.htm.
4 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conﬂicts (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3 (Additional Protocol I).
5 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ Rep 226.
6 See Michael N Schmitt, ‘Cyber Operations and the Jus in Bello’ (2011) 41 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights
113; Michael N Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello’ (2002) 84 International
Review of the Red Cross 365; Knut Dörmann, ‘Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network
Attacks’ (International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, September 2004), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ﬁles/other/
applicabilityoﬁhltocna.pdf; Jenny Döge, ‘Cyber-Warfare: Challenges for the Applicability of the Traditional
Laws of War Regime’ (2010) 48 Archiv des Völkerrechts 486.
7 Robin Geiß, ‘The Conduct of Hostilities in and via Cyberspace’, ASIL Proceedings 104th Annual Meeting, 2010;
Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare’ (n 6) 365.
8 Report of the Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security, UN Doc A/66/152, December 2011, 19.
9 cf Jakob Kellenberger, ‘International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies’ (Keynote address, 34th
Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, San Remo, 8–10 September 2011), http://
www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/new-weapon-technologies-statement-2011-09-08.htm.
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accepted legal deﬁnition of military objectives in the interconnected cyber domain will render
basically every cyber installation a legitimate military objective. In cyberspace, every component
of the cyber infrastructure is a dual-use object. After all, by and large the military uses the very
same cyber infrastructure that is used for civilian purposes.10 And, as is well known, all objects
which by their use or intended future use make an effective contribution to military action legally
qualify as legitimate military targets, and therefore may be lawfully attacked in the course of an
armed conﬂict.11 Evidently, this could have far reaching repercussions on the civilian population.
Nevertheless, the problem has hardly been addressed at all that, because of the systemic techno-
logical set-up of cyberspace in times of an armed conﬂict, basically every cyber installation –
possibly even cyberspace as such – potentially qualiﬁes as a military objective.12
Against this background, our analysis proceeds in three parts. First, we will show that the dis-
tinction between military and civilian objects in cyberspace, because of the interconnectedness of
civilian and military cyber infrastructure, is largely impossible on the basis of the established
legal deﬁnition of military objectives (below Section 2). Of course, ‘dual use’ is not a problem
exclusive to cyberspace.13 However, as we will show, the systemic technological set-up of cyber-
space, the inherent interconnectedness of civilian and military systems, brings this issue to the
fore in unprecedented ways. In essence, the entire cyber infrastructure (that is, computers, servers
and cables) is a dual-use object and therefore could be qualiﬁed as a legitimate military objective
in times of armed conﬂict. In terms of civilian protection and in view of increasingly cyber-reliant
societies, this is a highly problematic conclusion. Therefore, the second part of the analysis
(below Section 3) is devoted to potential solutions for a clearer separation of legitimate military
targets and protected civilian installations and networks. The approaches discussed range from
the exemption of central cyber infrastructure components that serve important civilian functions
to the creation of ‘digital safe havens’ de lege ferenda and possible precautionary obligations
regarding the segregation of military and civilian networks de lege lata on the basis of Article
58 of Additional Protocol I. Finally, in Section 4 we turn to the principle of proportionality
which leaves states with a greater margin of ﬂexibility than the more rigid approaches discussed
in Section 2 and therefore, at least for the time being, appears to be the most realistic and viable
way of mitigating the repercussions for the civilian population.
10 Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks’ (2010) 88 Texas Law
Review 1522, 1542.
11 Additional Protocol I (n 4) art 52(2). Of course, the deﬁnition contained in art 52(2) of Additional Protocol I is
two-pronged in that it not only requires that an object’s use would make an effective contribution to military
actions but that simultaneously the object’s destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, would also
offer a deﬁnite military advantage. However, in reality this second tier has rarely worked as an effective constraint
given that typically the destruction of any object which makes an effective contribution to military action also
offers a discernible military advantage.
12 But cf Kellenberger (n 9).
13 See Henry Shue and David Wippmann, ‘Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use Facilities Performing Indispensable
Civilian Functions’ (2002) 35 Cornell International Law Journal 559.
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2. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION IN AN INTERCONNECTED DOMAIN:
THE SYSTEMIC DUAL NATURE OF THE CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE
Where the means and methods of cyber warfare are aimed at traditional military objectives in the
‘physical world’, and where they result in the same ‘real world’ effects as would conventional
weapons, there appears to be no signiﬁcant controversy as to the application of the principle
of distinction.14 Whether a given military objective is attacked via cyberspace or via the air by
a drone or ﬁghter plane, for the purposes of international humanitarian law, essentially makes
no difference. Thus, if a physical object like a military communications centre or an electricity
plant is to be attacked and physically destroyed by means of a military cyber operation, the
attacking state would ﬁrst of all be obliged to establish whether the communication centre or,
more problematically, the electric power plant in question qualiﬁes as a legitimate military target.
Only after having assessed the proportionality of the envisaged attack, and after having taken all
required precautions, may the attack lawfully be carried out.15
Yet, with the ever increasing military importance of cyberspace, future armed conﬂicts invol-
ving high-tech parties will not only see the use of cyberspace as a medium to direct attacks
against physical objects such as power plants or military communication centres. Increasingly,
components of the cyberspace infrastructure will become strategic targets in and of themselves.16
The more important cyberspace becomes for military operations, the greater the strategic interest
to degrade an enemy’s capacity to use this domain for strategic purposes. Thus, the US
Quadrennial Defence Review Report emphasises that ‘in the 21st century, modern armed forces
simply cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without resilient, reliable information
and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace’.17
Consequently, military strategists appear to have no doubts that controlling cyberspace will
become as important a strategic goal for the military as obtaining control over airspace or the
sea has been in traditional conﬂicts.18 This will logically involve attempts to degrade an enemy’s
cyber capacities by destroying or manipulating the enemy’s cyber assets, infrastructure and key
communication nodes.19 It is no secret that already now the military of various states are prepar-
ing a potential future cyber battleﬁeld by way of pre-implanting concealed codes and software
tools in various strategically relevant places, as well as by manipulating hardware components
along the supply chain.20 Thus, the question of which networks and components of the cyber
14 cf Dröge (n 3).
15 Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare’ (n 6) 365.
16 cf Report of the Secretary-General (n 8) 10.
17 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (n 1) 37.
18 cf Report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (n 1).
19 ibid.
20 ‘By providing counterfeit hardware that already contains the Trojanized access built into the ﬁrmware or soft-
ware, a foreign intelligence service or similarly sophisticated attacker has a greater chance of successfully pene-
trating these downstream supply chains’: Report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(n 1) 11 ff.
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infrastructure will qualify as legitimate military objectives gains importance, especially for
increasingly cyber-reliant societies, and it is this question to which we now turn.
A sophisticated military cyber attack in the year 2012 has little in common with the ‘old-
fashioned’ computer virus that, like the so-called ‘I-love-you-virus’ in the year 2000, is hidden
in an email and sent from one computer to another.21 The possibilities of a military hacker are
vastly different and portentous. Thus, the herder of a botnet,22 for example, may utilise thousands
or even millions of civilian systems in various countries to generate computer power and to carry
out large-scale denial-of-service attacks. Alternatively, a sophisticated military cyber attack could
consist of bits and pieces of fragmented malware codes that lay dormant for weeks, months or
even years in various systems all over the world and that, triggered by a certain command or
event, such as troop mobilisation in an enemy country, are brought together in a predetermined
target where the malware unfolds its destructive or manipulative function.23 Until it does, the
codes used for such an operation are typically not recognisable as in any way being malicious.
In any case, cyber operations need not even rely on ‘malicious’ codes or worms. A cyber oper-
ation may simply rely on the right code – for example, the standard code for opening a valve in a
power plant – but activate it at the wrong time.
If the accepted deﬁnition of military objectives contained in Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I is applied in this context,24 a wide range of cyber assets that are principally civilian
in nature – for example, all the civilian systems unknowingly involved in a botnet – would qua-
lify as legitimate military objectives. They all make an effective contribution to military action by
virtue of the way in which they are used and their destruction or neutralisation would offer a deﬁ-
nite military advantage in accordance with Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I.
What is more, (military) codes travelling in cyberspace are split up into various data packages,
all of which may travel via different (civilian) channels and typically traverse various civilian
systems when travelling through cyberspace. Thus, even in a single cyber attack, a wide range
of physical cyber infrastructures – namely servers, routers, cables or satellites, as well as
21 Sandro Gaycken, Cyberwar – Das Wettrüsten hat längst begonnen, Vom digitalen Angriff zum realen
Ausnahmezustand (Goldmann 2012).
22 A computer that has been turned into a so-called ‘bot’ can perform automated or remote-controlled tasks without
the owner/user knowing it: http://www.microsoft.com/security/resources/botnet-whatis.aspx. See also Ralf Hund,
Matthias Hamann and Thorsten Holz, ‘Towards Next-Generation Botnets’ (4th European Conference on Computer
Network Defense (EC2ND 08)), http://www.ei.rub.de/media/emma/veroeffentlichungen/2010/08/05/
rambot-ec2nd08.pdf.
23 The recent report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission cites the authors of the Peoples
Liberation Army publication, ‘Information Confrontation Theory’, as stating that ‘information confrontation forces
can potentially plant malicious software in enemy weapons systems that will remain dormant until they are
employed; or pre-place malware on enemy information systems that will only activate at a preset time to destroy
an enemy’s C2 network or those circuits that control operation of railroads and military air routes, or divert trains
to wrong routes to cause trafﬁc jams’: Report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (n 1)
26, 27, citing Wang Zhengde, Yang Shisong and Zhou Lin (eds), Xinxi Duikang Lilun (PLA Information
Engineering University/Military Science Publishing House 2007) 12.
24 ‘It is agreed that this deﬁnition has acquired the status of customary international law notwithstanding continu-
ing controversy over its interpretation’: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary
International Humanitarian Law, vol I: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge
University Press 2009) (ICRC Study) rule 8.
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software – are used to make effective contributions to military action and would thus qualify as
legitimate military targets. For example, it is estimated that approximately 98 per cent of US gov-
ernment communications use civilian-owned and -operated networks.25
The problem of reliance by the military on civilian systems and infrastructure is further
exacerbated by the fact that, under the ambiguous ‘purpose criterion’ of Article 52(2) of
Additional Protocol I, an object’s intended future use for military action sufﬁces to render an
object a military target.26 As the commentary to the 2009 Air and Missile Warfare Manual
explains, ‘the purpose criterion recognizes that an attacker need not wait until a [civilian] object
is actually used for military ends before being allowed to attack it as a military objective’.27 As
Dinstein has put it, purpose is predicated on intentions known to guide the adversary.28
Establishing an enemy’s intentions, therefore, is crucial for the application of the purpose cri-
terion. This determination typically hinges on available intelligence. Where uncertainty remains,
Article 52(3) provides that in case of doubt – as far as objects normally dedicated to civilian pur-
poses are concerned – the objects in question shall be presumed not to be so used. This latter
caveat, however, has not acquired the status of customary law and, in any case, the civilian
cyber infrastructure hardly qualiﬁes as an object ‘normally dedicated to civilian purposes’
given that it is regularly used by the military. Where Article 52(3) is inapplicable, it is not clearly
established what degree of certainty or proof is required to establish an enemy’s intentions
regarding the future use of an object.29 In the case of cyber infrastructure, however, given that
the components of the civilian and military cyber infrastructure are systemically intertwined –
in fact, typically it is one and the same infrastructure that is being used – it is clear from the outset
of an armed conﬂict in which the parties employ means of cyber warfare that signiﬁcant parts of
the civilian cyber infrastructure will be used to make an effective contribution to military action.
What is unclear, of course, is which components exactly will be used for military purposes. In the
cyber realm, however, this has less to do with the unclear intentions of the adversary rather than
the functionality of cyberspace as such. In the cyber domain it is typically unclear – including to
the author of a cyber operation – which ways his data packages will take in order to arrive at their
intended target. In any case, in a future cyber conﬂict there will be thousands and millions of data
packages going in all directions. Because of the systemic interconnectedness of cyberspace, it
will hardly ever be possible to prove or to anticipate with any degree of certainty at which milli-
second which components of the cyber infrastructure are or will be used for a particular military
25 Jensen (n 10) 1542.
26 Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski and Bruno Zimmermann (eds), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of
8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross, Martinus
Nijhoff 1987) (ICRC Commentary) 2022; Ian Henderson, The Contemporary Law of Targeting: Military
Objectives, Proportionality and Precautions in Attack under Additional Protocol I (Martinus Nijhoff 2002) 84.
27 Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂict Research, ‘Commentary on the HPCR Manual on International
Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare’ (version 2.1, March 2010, 107), http://ihlresearch.org/amw/
Commentary%20on%20the%20HPCR%20Manual.pdf.
28 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conﬂict (2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press 2010) 99–100.
29 Stefan Oeter, ‘Methods and Means of Combat’ in Dieter Fleck (ed), The Handbook of International
Humanitarian Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 81–180.
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operation. While we are much in favour of the argument that in view of such uncertainty the pre-
sumption should always be in favour of protected (that is, civilian) status, we remain doubtful that
such a restrictive approach would ﬁnd acceptance in state practice, especially if in a future armed
conﬂict the overall strategic aim is to degrade the enemy’s cyber capacities.
Of course, an object’s current or intended future use in and of itself does not sufﬁce to qualify
an object as a legitimate military objective. Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I requires a two-
pronged test; this means that, in addition to the establishment of one of the objective criteria of
nature, location, purpose or use, it also needs to be shown that an object’s ‘destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a deﬁnite military advantage’.
Notwithstanding, when assessing whether a given object qualiﬁes as a military objective, the
emphasis usually lies only on the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition.30 Thus, the commentary to the
Air and Missile Warfare Manual provides that ‘[i]n practical terms, compliance with the ﬁrst cri-
terion will generally result in the advantage required of the second’.31 In line with this assumption
the Commentary states:32
The civilian character of an object can be lost through location, purpose or use.… [A] residence is a civilian
object, but becomes amilitary objective if used to billet troops. Finally, a civilian ocean liner being ﬁtted for
intended future use as a military troop transport qualiﬁes as a military objective by purpose.
The problem with such a sweeping conclusion is that it neglects the second part of the deﬁnition
contained in Article 52(2).
Conversely, to some authors this second part of the deﬁnition, by adding a criterion of ‘situa-
tional relevance’, constitutes a signiﬁcant constraint on the scope of military objectives.33 While
this approach better adheres to the two-pronged structure of Article 52, it is not without problems
either. The difﬁculty is that it is unclear how far the ﬁrst and the second tests are different from
one another. In fact, it seems rather difﬁcult to come up with clear-cut examples where an object
is used or intended to be used to make an effective contribution to military action without its
destruction offering a deﬁnite military advantage to the enemy. The example provided by
Shue and Wippmann is that of ‘a heavy bridge that would enable tanks to cross into a combat
area on the other side of a river’ and which would therefore ‘generally qualify as a military
objective under the ﬁrst part of the [deﬁnition]’. However, according to the authors, ‘if in fact
no combat is occurring or is likely to occur in the area to which the bridge leads’, its destruction –
because of a lack of ‘situational relevance’ – would not offer a deﬁnite military advantage and
could therefore not be lawfully destroyed.34
The problem with this example is that it conﬂates the ﬁrst and the second parts of the deﬁ-
nition contained in Article 52(2). Because if indeed there is ‘no combat occurring or likely to
30 See eg Dinstein (n 28) 94.
31 Commentary on the HPCR Manual (n 27) 49.
32 ibid 32.
33 Shue and Wippmann (n 13) 561.
34 ibid.
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occur in the area to which the bridge leads’, the bridge would not be making an effective contri-
bution to military action in the ﬁrst place, thereby failing to fulﬁl even the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition.
The splitting up of the two-pronged test in Article 52(2) into an abstract test (ﬁrst part) and a con-
crete test of situational relevance (second part) does not seem to work because the determination of
whether an object like a bridge makes an effective contribution to military action (ﬁrst part) necess-
arily needs to take into consideration the concrete circumstances. Otherwise a bridge is just a
bridge, a civilian object without any military relevance. If Shue and Wippmann were correct, a
tank – just like the bridge in their example – that is not currently in use and not likely to be
used in the near future would not fulﬁl the test of ‘situational relevance’ and would therefore
not qualify as a military objective. Such a narrow reading of Article 52(2), while it is a rare attempt
to make sense of the two-pronged test contained therein, is unlikely to ﬁnd acceptance in state prac-
tice. Typically, already the ﬁrst part of the deﬁnition, in line with the convoluted wording of the
provision, is interpreted to consider aspects of situational relevance, thereby depriving the second
part of the test largely of any autonomous meaning.35
Because of the technological features of cyberspace, however, it could be possible to come up
with examples where the second part of the test is of autonomous relevance. Cyberspace is lar-
gely resilient, meaning that if certain communication channels are obstructed or destroyed, the
communication ﬂow will simply ﬁnd another way, and in the interconnected domain of cyber-
space there are always various alternatives. Against this background it could be argued that
even if the civilian cyber infrastructure, by way of its use or intended future use, makes an
effective contribution to military action, its destruction would still not offer a deﬁnite military
advantage because the destruction or neutralisation of such infrastructure would not signiﬁcantly
hamper the enemy’s ability to conduct cyber operations. Of course, no one would argue that the
destruction of military barracks does not offer a military advantage simply because the enemy has
various other military barracks at its disposal. Cyberspace would allow a different conclusion
only if its resilience was such that the destruction or neutralisation of certain infrastructure
components would be without any effect whatsoever. This, however, does not appear to be
the case. While it may not be possible to shut down the internet in its entirety, degrading the
enemy’s possibilities to conduct cyber operations is technically possible and will indeed be an
overall strategic aim in any future cyber conﬂict.36 Therefore, on the basis of the traditional
deﬁnition of military objectives, one does not even need to go as far as to invoke the controversial
approach of qualifying all so-called (economic) ‘war sustaining’ objects37 as military objectives;
35 Dinstein (n 28) 90–91. For example, Dinstein asserts that deserted military barracks remain a military objective
and thereby implicitly discards the situational relevance criterion suggested by Shue and Wippmann (n 13) 94.
36 Report of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (n 1) 42–43. See also Northrop Grumman,
‘Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation’
(Report prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 9 October 2009, 23), http://
www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16
Oct2009.pdf.
37 ibid 110.
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it will be possible to qualify a wide range of cyber infrastructure as legitimate military
objectives.
Of course, in theory every civilian object in the ‘physical world’ could also fall within the
deﬁnition contained in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. Theoretically, every object is a
so-called ‘dual-use object’ on the basis of contemporary international humanitarian law.38 De
facto, however, most civilian objects in the real world simply have no signiﬁcant military poten-
tial and therefore will never be used in a militarily conducive way. This is one aspect in which the
cyber domain appears to be fundamentally different. Each and every bit of memory capacity or
computer power, wherever it resides, has military potential at all times. This is the reason why
civilian and military systems are inherently interconnected. There simply is no difference
between a military and a civilian computer; any computer and basically any part of the larger
cyber infrastructure can be used to serve the military and the civilian constituency either inter-
changeably or simultaneously.
Indeed, in the cyber domain such ‘dual use’ will typically occur simultaneously. Thus, 99
per cent of a server’s capacity may be used exclusively to carry out important civilian functions,
while 1 per cent, or even only 0.1 per cent, of its capacity may simultaneously be used for mili-
tary communications and other military purposes. The issue of such simultaneous use – albeit not
a problem exclusive to cyberspace, as any electricity plant in times of armed conﬂict may serve
military and civilian purposes simultaneously – as far as can be seen has only rarely been dis-
cussed. Notwithstanding, the general view appears to be that any military use, however minimal,
would render a civilian object a military objective.39 It follows that in a future ‘cyber war’ the
established deﬁnition of military objectives, despite striking an accepted balance between mili-
tary needs for ﬂexibility and civilian protection in traditional armed conﬂicts, could render basi-
cally every component of the cyber infrastructure a legitimate military objective.
This is not only because of the inherent interconnectedness of cyberspace but also the artiﬁ-
ciality of the cyber domain. In a naturally occurring theatre of war like the air, a military ﬁghter
jet uses the airspace to travel, but only the aircraft will qualify as a military objective. In the cyber
domain, given that it is a man-made domain which ultimately consists of various physical com-
ponents (of course, in addition to various software components which, however, cannot function
without an underlying hardware infrastructure), the focus is not on the travelling malware – mal-
icious codes, as stated above, are typically indistinguishable from other codes and hence imposs-
ible to detect – but rather primarily on the physical infrastructure that is used to execute such a
cyber operation. These infrastructure components, however, are typically civilian by nature and
serve primarily important civilian functions. Thus, even though technically cyberspace would
seem to allow for a high degree of precision and, in fact, hyper-distinctive attacks against speciﬁc
38 ibid 108: ‘Any civilian object may become a military objective through use, including those entitled to speciﬁc
protection but abused by a Belligerent Party through military use. Even objects entitled to speciﬁc protection, such
as medical units or cultural property can become military objectives if so used.’ See also Shue and Wippmann
(n 13) 565.
39 Dinstein (n 28) 141.
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military installations – Stuxnet being exemplary for such speciﬁcity40 – legally speaking, on the
basis of the contemporary deﬁnition of military objectives, a country’s entire cyber infrastructure
could potentially be qualiﬁed as a military objective once it engages in an armed conﬂict.
Especially for modern states and societies where important aspects of civilian life heavily and
increasingly depend on a functioning cyber environment, this is a worrying conclusion.
3. DISENTANGLING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE
Of course, a narrower deﬁnition of military objectives could help to strike a more adequate bal-
ance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations for purposes of the cyber
domain, and to better distinguish legitimate targets from protected systems and installations.
Politically, however, such an avenue hardly seems viable. Despite the fact that the established
deﬁnition of military objectives has always been criticised by some authors as being ‘so sweeping
that it can cover practically anything’,41 if at all, the recent trend has rather been in the direction of
further expanding this deﬁnition, as is reﬂected by the controversy over war-sustaining objects on
the one hand, or the more recent suggestion of a new subcategory of ‘temporary military objec-
tives by nature’ on the other.42
An alternative way could be to allow only certain forms of attack, namely reversible cyber
attacks rather than destructive attacks against such cyber installations that, despite qualifying
as military objectives, nevertheless serve a predominantly civilian function. However, it seems
utopian to believe that states would or could ever accept a hard and fast obligation to resort
only to attacks the effects of which are reversible, notwithstanding the fact that from a strategic
point of view it may often make sense to opt for non-destructive attacks and thereby to leave the
enemy’s cyber infrastructure intact. For the sake of legal coherence and clarity, entirely novel
legal concepts – such as a cyber-speciﬁc deﬁnition of military objectives or a legal obligation
to carry out reversible attacks against virtual dual-use targets – would not be conducive in the
realm of jus in bello. In particular, such an approach would lead to a fragmentation of the huma-
nitarian legal regimes applicable in the cyber domain and other theatres of warfare.43 Therefore,
more plausible solutions may be found on the basis of existing law, namely by way of analogy or
extension of the list of objects contained in Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, by reference to
40 On the Stuxnet attack, see Nicolas Falliere, Liam O Murchu and Eric Chien, ‘W32.Stuxnet Dossier’ (version
1.4, February 2011), http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/
w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf.
41 Antonio Cassese, ‘Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law’ (2001)
European Journal of International Law 993.
42 Commentary on the HPCR Manual (n 27) 109. For a critique of this approach, see the remarks made by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) included in a footnote to the Commentary, ibid n 25.
43 It is, inter alia, for this reason that we reject proposals for a cyber-speciﬁc broadening of the range of military
targets in the context of cyber attacks; see Jeffrey T G Kelsey, ‘Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The
Principles of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare’ (2008) 106 Michigan Law Review 1427.
Moreover, Kelsey’s approach is based on the assumed non-lethal nature of cyber attacks, an assumption which
in such generality is hardly maintainable.
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Article 58(a) and (c) of Additional Protocol I or, perhaps most realistically, by relying on a
thorough assessment of proportionality adapted to the technical speciﬁcities of cyberspace.
3.1 ARTICLE 56 OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I: EXEMPTING FROM ATTACK IMPORTANT
DUAL-USE CYBER INFRASTRUCTURE THAT SERVES IMPORTANT CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS
An alternative to the above mentioned suggestions that, arguably, better responds to the recipro-
cal interests of states in the maintenance of an overall functionality of cyberspace could be to
exclude from the ambit of legitimate military targets, either per se or under certain conditions
(that is, in cases of minimal use for military purposes), speciﬁc cyber infrastructure components,
such as the main internet exchange nodes or central servers on which millions of important civi-
lian functions rely.
This approach is neither new nor alien to humanitarian law. Article 56(1) of Additional
Protocol I exempts certain objects from attack, even where these objects qualify as military objec-
tives, because of the severe humanitarian consequences an attack on these objects might have.44
Thus, Article 56(1) lists dual-use objects the destruction of which could release dangerous forces,
thereby signiﬁcantly affecting the civilian population. On the basis of this reasoning, Article
51(1) provides that even other military objectives located in the vicinity of such installations
shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces
and consequential severe losses among the civilian population.
Transposed to the realm of cyberspace, such a de lege ferenda approach could be applied to
those cyber installations – similar to the objects currently listed in Article 56 of Additional
Protocol I – the neutralisation or destruction of which would typically result in signiﬁcant civilian
impact that would outweigh the military beneﬁts. In the realm of cyberspace this approach could
help to mitigate repercussions on the civilian population which stem from the fact that central
components of the dual-use cyber infrastructure would inevitably always be implicated in mili-
tary cyber operations, however minimal, and in spite of the fact that they serve primarily civilian
functions and may be essential for the overall functionality of civilian cyber trafﬁc. Indeed, in the
cyber realm such exemptions would appear to be particularly relevant given that the repercus-
sions on civilian functionality resulting from the neutralisation or destruction of central cyber
infrastructure components cannot geographically be conﬁned to the targeted country but may
have repercussions for the functionality of cyberspace worldwide.45
44 Dinstein (n 28) 102.
45 Of course, possible effects on another state’s civilian population (ie the civilian population of a state which is not
a party to the international armed conﬂict) belong in the realm of the law of neutrality. Convention (V) respecting
the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (The Hague, 18 October 1907, 205
CTS 229), art 1 stipulates that ‘[t]he territory of neutral Powers is inviolable’, but it remains to be seen how the law
of neutrality, especially in as much as it is territory-based, may be applied in the cyber domain and whether the
repercussions of a cyber attack directed against State A would be viewed as a violation of the law on neutrality if
they also degrade cyber functionality in State B, thereby affecting the civilian population in State B.
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Even though there are, in our view, good reasons for excluding certain vital cyber infra-
structure components from attacks even where because of their dual nature they qualify as
military objectives, analogies to Article 56 or even a de lege ferenda extension of this provision
to the cyber domain do not appear to be feasible options. First of all, de lege lata the exemption
provided by Article 56(1) of Additional Protocol I is justiﬁed only on the basis of the possibility
of ‘severe losses among the civilian population’; the civilian impact in the case of attacks against
central cyber infrastructure components – although it would most likely be on a very large
scale, causing the loss of cyber functionality for thousands of people – would typically not
reach a similar level of severity as an attack on a nuclear facility or a dam. Secondly, the destruc-
tion of central cyber infrastructure components does not cause dangerous emissions as would the
destruction of the objects listed in Article 56. The destruction of central servers may, of course,
lead to very widespread, unforeseeable and possibly uncontrollable reverberating effects.
However, as the law currently stands, reverberating effects in and of themselves do not satisfy
the entry criterion of Article 56 of Additional Protocol I, which requires emissions that are
dangerous in and of themselves; their consideration belongs to the realm of the principle of
proportionality.
3.2 SEGREGATING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN NETWORKS: ARTICLE 58 OF ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL I
Of course, a large-scale segregation of military and civilian networks and cyber infrastructure
from a humanitarian law point of view would appear to be the most effective measure to enable
a clearer distinction between military and civilian objects. Evidently, if civilian networks and
civilian cyber infrastructure components are clearly separated from military networks and are
thus no longer used for military purposes, the above described dual-use problem is signiﬁcantly
mitigated. Alternatively, at least certain highly sensitive civilian networks and infrastructure pil-
lars, the functionality of which is essential for the civilian population, could be physically
removed and disconnected from other networks and the general cyber infrastructure. States
may, of course, pursue such approaches for strategic and security reasons. Thus far, however,
this has not occurred on any signiﬁcant scale with respect to civilian systems.46
3.2.1 PRECAUTIONARY OBLIGATIONS DERIVED FROM ARTICLE 58(A) OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
The question at issue is whether international humanitarian law imposes any kind of
obligation on states to keep civilian and military networks segregated or to separate such net-
works and cyber infrastructure components where the coalescence has already occurred. In
this context the obligation to take so-called passive precautions (that is, precautions against
the effects of attacks) as it is set out in Article 58 of Additional Protocol I47 – a provision
46 Jensen (n 10) 1552.
47 ibid.
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which has acquired the status of customary international law and thus applies in both inter-
national and non-international armed conﬂicts – appears to be of central importance.48 Article
58 in the relevant part provides that ‘[t]he Parties to the conﬂict shall, to the maximum extent
feasible: a) … endeavour to remove … civilian objects under their control from the vicinity of
military objectives’.
However, the obligation laid out in Article 58(a) of Additional Protocol I is subject to a num-
ber of limitations. First, all obligations contained in Article 58 are limited by the preceding phrase
‘to the maximum extent feasible’,49 which is interpreted to mean that the obligation is limited to
those precautions which are practicable or practically possible,50 taking into account all circum-
stances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.51 The phrase is
reﬂective of the concerns of various states about the difﬁculty or impossibility of separation in
many instances.52 The obligation contained in subparagraph (a) is further limited by the use of
the word ‘endeavour’, which arguably qualiﬁes the obligation as being an obligation of conduct
rather than an obligation of result.53 Certainly a large-scale segregation of networks would require
a structural remodelling of the entire current technological set-up of cyberspace which, for the
time being, is systemically interconnected. It appears doubtful that such a large-scale segregation
could be deemed ‘practically possible’, especially in view of the fact that thus far states have
not shown any signiﬁcant interest – neither economic nor strategic – in disentangling military
and civilian cyber infrastructure components in view of the costs and difﬁculties this would
entail.54
Secondly, even when leaving aside the question of whether any such structural segregation
would be ‘feasible’ in the sense of Article 58 of Additional Protocol I, the obligation to take pas-
sive precautions must not be confused with the question of whether civilian objects may be used
for military purposes. International humanitarian law in general and Article 58(a) of Additional
Protocol I in particular do not prohibit ‘dual use’.55 Rather, Article 58(a) operates on the
48 ICRC Study (n 24) rules 22, 23, 24.
49 This limitation applies to the different obligations laid out in art 58(a)–(c): see Diplomatic Conference leading to
the Adoption of the Additional Protocols, Report to Committee III on the Work of the Working Group, 65.
50 ICRC Study (n 24) Commentary to rule 22.
51 cf, for instance, the reservation issued by the United Kingdom on the date of its ratiﬁcation of Additional
Protocol I on 28 January 1998, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/0A9E03F0F2EE757CC1256402003FB6D2?
OpenDocument.
52 ICRC Study (n 24) Commentary to rule 22.
53 On this distinction, cf Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘Obligation of Result versus Obligation of Conduct – Some Thoughts
about the Implementation of International Obligations’ in Mahnoush H Arsanjani and others (eds), Looking to the
Future – Essays on International Law in Honor of W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoff 2011) 363.
54 Jensen (n 10) 1569, who argues that ‘the near-complete interconnectedness of government and civilian cyber
systems makes segregation under Article 58 (a) and (b) impractical’.
55 International humanitarian law merely prescribes that civilian objects which are used or intended to be used for
military purposes will thereby qualify as legitimate military objectives with the consequence that they could be
attacked. A similar regulation is adopted under international humanitarian law where civilians take a direct part
in hostilities, thereby losing their protection from attack. Such a direct participation may, of course, amount to
a criminal offence under domestic criminal law, but it is not prohibited nor privileged on the level of the jus in
bello; cf Nils Melzer, ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities
(International Committee of the Red Cross 2009) rule X, 83.
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assumption that a clear-cut distinction between military targets and protected civilian objects is
possible and it is on the basis of this assumption that Article 58 prescribes the segregation of such
objects in order to better protect the civilian objects.
The speciﬁc problem in cyberspace, however, pertains to the systemic dual-use character of
the entire cyber infrastructure and the impossibility to single out – at least with any degree of
certainty – networks or infrastructure components that only serve civilian functions. In other
words the main problem in cyberspace as it currently exists is not that civilian and military instal-
lations are too close together (this being the problem Article 58(a) aims to solve) but that they are
one and the same. Structurally this problem and the idea of creating ‘digital safe havens’56 is
therefore more akin to the concept of demilitarised zones as envisaged in Article 60 of
Additional Protocol I – namely zones that could potentially be used for military operations
but where agreement is reached between the parties to an armed conﬂict not to use such
zones for military purposes, rather than the obligation to separate distinguishable military and
civilian objects from one another as foreseen by Article 58(a).
In other words, even if states were willing to segregate certain civilian or exclusively military
networks from the general cyber infrastructure, they would still need to reach agreement that
these civilian networks, given that technically they could still be used for military communi-
cations and other military purposes, should be protected and used only for civilian functions.
Moreover, given that many military uses of cyberspace relate to concealment, spooﬁng and
manipulation, it is not clear whether exclusively civilian use could ever be ensured or reliably
agreed upon. And even if this were possible in times of peace, it is far from clear whether
such an agreement could ever be sustained in times of armed conﬂict because, once the function-
ality of the military networks is degraded, parties to an armed conﬂict would most likely turn to
still functioning civilian systems as a strategic back-up option. Therefore, as much as we favour
the idea of a general and large-scale segregation of military and civilian cyber infrastructure and
networks, such a far-reaching remodelling obligation of an entire technology, in our view, cannot
be deduced from Article 58(a) of Additional Protocol I.
3.2.2 PRECAUTIONARY OBLIGATIONS DERIVED FROM ARTICLE 58(C) OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I
In addition to Article 58(a), subparagraph (c) of the same provision lays out the general obli-
gation to take other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population and civilian objects
under the control of the respective party to an armed conﬂict from the dangers resulting
from military operations.57 The ICRC Commentary mentions preparations for effective ﬁre-
ﬁghting as a relevant example for a precaution in the sense of subparagraph (c) in traditional
56 Adam Segal, ‘Cyberspace Governance: The Next Step’ (Council on Foreign Relations, Policy Innovation
Memorandum No 2, 14 November 2011, 1), http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/cyberspace-governance-next-step/
p24397.
57 emphasis added.
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contexts.58 The ICRC Study cites, inter alia, the guarding of civilian property.59 Like the obli-
gation in Article 58(a) of Additional Protocol I, the obligation to take other precautions in sub-
paragraph (c) is limited by the caveat ‘to the maximum extent feasible’.60 But Article 58(c) goes
further in that it requires all kinds of precautions, which means measures taken in advance, that
may have protective effects for the civilian population. In light of the overall object and purpose
of this provision to better protect the civilian population, transposed to the cyber domain it may
thus be argued that states, ‘to the maximum extent feasible’, will be required to ensure a continu-
ing cyber functionality where such functionality is crucial for the maintenance of critical civilian
infrastructure.61 For example, in a country where the civilian electrical power grid or essential
civilian communication systems are heavily reliant on a functioning cyber infrastructure, states
– to the maximum extent feasible – will be required to provide back-up modes for the continuing
operation of these power grids and communication networks.
4. THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY
The systemic use of civilian networks and central cyber infrastructure components for military
purposes means that the likelihood of adverse repercussions for the civilian population in
times of armed conﬂict is considerably high. Precisely because of this systemic dual use of
most cyber components it is rather unlikely, as has been shown above, that states (at least, for
the time being) would be willing to agree on rigid solutions such as the general exclusion of cer-
tain cyber assets from attack or a legal obligation to disentangle interconnected networks. The
general principle of proportionality offers more ﬂexibility in this regard. According to Article
51(5)(b) of Additional Protocol I, which is accepted as having acquired the status of customary
international law,62 incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects or
a combination thereof is prohibited if it is excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated.63 There is no controversy about the general applicability of this principle
in the cyber domain.64 Nevertheless, the systemic technological features of cyberspace raise the
question as to how the proportionality assessment should be conducted when cyber infrastructure
components are the object of an attack.65 The law is rather straightforward about what may be
considered relevant for the purposes of a proportionality assessment: ‘Loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof’. In this regard different
58 ICRC Commentary (n 26) 2258.
59 ICRC Study (n 24) rule 22.
60 cf ibid section 3.2.1.
61 cf Jensen (n 10) 1553.
62 ICRC Study (n 24) rule 14.
63 Dinstein (n 28) 128.
64 Schmitt, ‘Wired Warfare’ (n 6) 390; Eric Talbot Jensen, ‘Unexpected Consequences from Knock-on Effects: A
Different Standard for Computer Network Operations?’ (2003) 18 American University International Law Review
1145, 1154–61.
65 For the general difﬁculties in the application of the humanitarian proportionality principle, see eg Oeter (n 29)
204.
2012] CYBER WARFARE 395
situations should be distinguished. First of all, where cyber infrastructure (still) qualiﬁes as a civi-
lian object and where it is physically destroyed by the side effects of either a conventional mili-
tary attack or a cyber attack, it must be factored into the proportionality equation as this would
clearly amount to damage to a civilian object.
Secondly, however, the more difﬁcult situation arises with respect to dual-use cyber infra-
structure that qualiﬁes as a legitimate military objective but simultaneously serves important
civilian functions. As has been shown above, as far as attacks on cyber infrastructure com-
ponents are concerned, this will be a rather typical scenario.66 Consider the following example:
10 per cent of a central server’s capacity is used for military purposes; 90 per cent of its
capacity serves civilian functions. The server thus qualiﬁes as a legitimate military objective
in line with the questionable but seemingly common understanding that any military use, how-
ever minimal, qualiﬁes an entire object as a legitimate military objective. The server is then
rendered dysfunctional by way of a cyber attack without any physical destruction of the hard-
ware. Which civilian aspects are relevant for the proportionality assessment in this scenario?
Clearly, the server itself as a military objective would not ﬁgure within the proportionality
equation. However, in view of its dual character and in light of the fact that 90 per cent of
its capacity was used for civilian communications and services, there will be widespread
loss of functionality for civilian purposes. Nevertheless, in this scenario the assessment of
what may be considered as a proportionality-relevant factor is complicated principally for
two reasons.
First, it is generally not entirely clear to what degree so-called ‘reverberating effects’ may be
taken into consideration for the purposes of the proportionality calculus in the case of dual-use
objects. This, of course, is not a cyber-speciﬁc problem. Rather, it is an issue which has been the
subject of debate for some time, typically in relation to attacks on electrical power plants.67 It
seems plausible that all ‘foreseeable long-term damages’68 should be considered and that, even
if a dual-use object qualiﬁes as a military objective, the adverse civilian side effects that come
with its destruction should be considered within the proportionality equation.69 Indeed, if even
minimal military use turns a dual-use object into a legitimate military objective, then at least
the adverse civilian impact must be considered as a relevant factor within the proportionality
calculus.
Second, in line with the enumeration contained in Article 51(5)(b), it is clear that in any case
only the ‘loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof’ could be considered as relevant collateral damage. Thus, if it is accepted that foreseeable
66 ibid 7.
67 Michael N Schmitt, ‘The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare’ (1999) 2 Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal 143, 168; James W Crawford III, ‘The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the
Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems’ (1997) 21 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 101, 106; James
A Burger, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Kosovo Crisis: Lessons Learned or to be Learned (2000)
82 International Review of the Red Cross 129, 134.
68 Oeter (n 29) 181.
69 Shue and Wippmann (n 13) 565.
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reverberating effects are to be included in the proportionality calculus, there still appears to be a
limitation to such effects that could be subsumed under the wording of Article 51(5)(b), which is
also accepted as customary international law. This means, however, that the mere loss of func-
tionality – in the example provided above a 90 per cent functionality loss of a central server –
may generally not enter the proportionality calculus as a relevant factor. Of course, one could
arrive at a different conclusion if the phrase ‘damage to civilian objects’ were seen as broad
enough to cover such effects. A systematic argument in this respect may be drawn from a com-
parison of Article 51(5)(b) and Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I. Whereas Article 52(2)
differentiates between ‘destruction’ on the one hand and ‘neutralisation’ on the other, Article
51(5)(b) speaks of ‘damage’. It could thus be argued that the word ‘damage’ as it is used in inter-
national humanitarian law comprises both the destruction as well as the neutralisation of an
object. Certainly, the word ‘damage’ does not exclude loss of functionality without physical
destruction. In addition, a teleological argument can be drawn from Article 51 in combination
with the general rule laid out in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, the overall purpose of
which it is to better protect the civilian population against dangers arising from military oper-
ations. It would appear counter-intuitive that only the physical destruction of a civilian object
should be taken into consideration, whereas functionality loss – even if it affects the civilian
population much more severely – should be irrelevant.
Indeed, a narrow reading of the phrase ‘damage to civilian objects’ that is limited to physical
destruction would lead to the following result. Whereas the destruction of a single civilian car
would amount to legally relevant, albeit rather insigniﬁcant, ‘collateral damage’, the disconnec-
tion of thousands or millions of households, companies and public services from the internet or
other communication services, or the severance of online ﬁnancial transactions for a country’s
entire economy and the corresponding economic and societal effects as such would not count
as relevant elements to be factored into the proportionality calculus. Only when and where
these effects foreseeably resulted in the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects could they be considered as factors relevant for the proportionality calculus.70
Given that it is extremely difﬁcult to determine in advance what the foreseeable physical effects
of a large-scale attack against cyber infrastructure components may be – in the interconnected
domain of cyberspace such operations may have a number of cascading effects that are hard
to predict – the inclusion of direct effects such as the loss of functionality into the list of
proportionality-relevant factors would greatly facilitate the application of the proportionality prin-
ciple, especially in the cyber domain. Evidently, the more cyber-reliant a society is – and in the
future this reliance will only increase in a growing number of states – the more detrimental the
effects of such functionality loss on the civilian population will be. Much of modern life and
indeed vital services in modern societies already rely on a functioning cyber infrastructure.
According to the US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, ‘cyberspace
70 emphasis added.
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will become increasingly woven into the fabric of everyday life across the globe’.71 Against this
background, in line with the overall object and purpose of the humanitarian proportionality prin-
ciple to mitigate the civilian impact of military operations as far as possible, and in line with the
widely accepted expansion of the application of the humanitarian proportionality principle to the
cyber domain where almost every object is a dual-use object, we suggest a dynamic interpretation
of the wording ‘damage to civilian objects’, which also considers the loss of functionality of a
dual-use object as a relevant factor within the proportionality equation.
5. CONCLUSION
Unlike the natural theatres of war, the artiﬁcial domain of cyberspace is made up of physical
components. Because of the systemic interconnectedness of networks and systems in cyberspace
and the fact that the military currently relies heavily on civilian cyber infrastructure to execute its
communications and cyber operations, in times of an armed conﬂict, on the basis of the law as it
currently stands, a wide range of essential components of the cyber infrastructure would legally
qualify as legitimate military objectives. This is an alarming conclusion and one that should be
acknowledged more widely than it has been to date.
Evidently, if systems which are civilian in nature and serve primarily important civilian inter-
ests, such as economic and other societal functions, will nevertheless qualify as legitimate mili-
tary objectives as a result of their dual use, this will the increase adverse impact on the civilian
population. Unfortunately, without further development of the law, there appears to be no com-
pletely satisfactory solution to this problem. Of course, theoretically there are a number of sol-
utions that could be drawn from the existing humanitarian legal framework, such as the
creation of digital safe havens in cyberspace, or attack exemptions regarding essential cyber
installations and infrastructure components that may qualify as legitimate military objectives
but serve civilian functions of the highest priority. A segregation of military and civilian net-
works and cyber infrastructure would arguably best safeguard civilian interests and protection.
However, while states are, of course, free to employ such measures, it appears that there is cur-
rently no hard and fast legal obligation under the international humanitarian legal framework to
adopt any of these solutions.
Thus, while states will be under an obligation to adopt precautions in line with Articles 57 and
58 of Additional Protocol I and their respective customary law pendants, for the time being the
principle of proportionality is of crucial importance for the mitigation of adverse impact on the
civilian population. In view of an ever increasing reliance on cyber functionality in modern
societies, it appears counter-intuitive and outdated to suggest that only the physical destruction
of objects should be included in the proportionality calculus. In many instances cyber attacks
will not lead to physical destruction but to the loss or degradation of the targeted object’s func-
tionality, be it a central server or an electric power plant. Therefore, in line with the widely
71 US Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (July 2011, 1), http://www.defense.gov/news/
d20110714cyber.pdf.
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accepted view that traditional international humanitarian law is applicable also in cyberspace, we
suggest a dynamic interpretation of the wording ‘damage to civilian objects’, an interpretation
that also considers the loss of functionality as a relevant factor within the proportionality
equation. While similar suggestions have rightly been made with regard to conventional attacks
on electricity plants and similar dual-use objects, the humanitarian necessity for an expansion of
the range of proportionality relevant factors appears to be of particular urgency in the cyber
domain where dual use appears to be the rule rather than the exception.
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